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11 Introduction
Dynamic games with incomplete information have a long history in economics. With few
exceptions, these games model the uncertainty as ﬁxed throughout the game, and private
signals about the state of nature are observed only once at the beginning of the game. In
many of these models, information is asymmetric, with one player’s information being ﬁner
than his opponent’s. Players may know their own payoﬀs, as in games of reputation (see
Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for a survey), or they may not necessarily know those, as in
the games considered by Aumann and Maschler (1968, 1995). In these games, two players are
engaged in a repeated zero-sum game, whose payoﬀ matrix depends on the state of nature
that is drawn according to some commonly known distribution. The informed player observes
the state; his opponent, on the other hand, has no proprietary information. Actions taken
during the game are observed, but payoﬀs are not. Our understanding of these games spans
a variety of issues: the payoﬀs that can be attained; the structure of the strategies achieving
those; and the long-run outcome of the game.
Yet in many applications, uncertainty evolves. In reputation models, for instance, the in-
formed player’s preferences might change. Equivalently, the informed player might be replaced
in a way that cannot be observed: restaurants change ownership, hedge funds change man-
agement. Such extensions are not only realistic. They are also called for by some of the more
paradoxical features of traditional models. (For instance, they can explain why reputations
need not disappear in the long-run.)
In economics, there is a burgeoning literature on such Markov games. See Athey and
Bagwell (2008), Mailath and Samuelson (2001), Phelan (2006) and Wiseman (2008). In these
papers, the type of one of the players is private information and aﬀects the players’ preferences
over outcomes. The type changes over time according to a Markov process. On the pure game-
theoretic side, Renault (2006) considers a variant of the Aumann-Maschler setup, in which the
state of the game follows a Markov chain. One of the players always observes the realization
of the current state, while the other player only observes the past actions chosen by the ﬁrst
player.
While attractive, these models remain very challenging. As optimization problems, these
are partially observable competitive Markov decision processes, in which players diﬀer in their
2observation of the underlying state. Renault (2006) provides a result on the existence of the
value for such games. Neyman (2008) obtains an alternative proof to Renault’s result, using a
reduction to the case of repeated games with incomplete information on one side ` a la Aumann
and Maschler. However, neither paper provides a method for determining the value, or for
identifying optimal strategies.
This paper illustrates the diﬃculties raised by such games, and suggests some methods
to tackle them, within the framework of a simple, but paradigmatic example. This example
has been introduced by Renault (2006), and generalizes a well-known example by Aumann
and Maschler (1995). It features the basic trade-oﬀ displayed by such games, as the informed
player would like to take advantage of his private information, but doing so would reveal it.
Despite the simplicity of this game, we are only able to solve the game (value and optimal
strategies) for a subset of parameters. We rely on the average cost optimality equation, which
is well known in operations research, to verify the optimality of some strategy proﬁles. For
the informed player, the optimal strategy that is identiﬁed is Markovian (with respect to the
commonly known belief of his opponent). Remarkably, this strategy is myopically optimal in
the stage game given this belief. For the uninformed player instead, the optimal strategy is
represented by a ﬁnite-state automaton. The scope and generality of these properties remain
to be seen. We strongly hope that our analysis piques some theorists’ curiosity, and paves the
way towards a more general analysis.
Our approach also suggests that numerical methods might be fruitfully applied to this type
of problem, since it reduces the problem of determining the value to the study of average cost
optimality equations. One of the diﬃculties is that the state space for one of the dynamic
programming problems is continuous, namely, it is the set of possible beliefs. Polynomial
methods can be used to numerically solve such problems (see, for instance, Judd (1998) for an
overview), although most results are for the discounted case. One possible approach is via the
Tauberian theorem relating the average reward criterion to the discounted reward criterion
(see, for instance, Ma and Powell (2008) for a survey as well as recent results). Alternatively,
there are algorithms that directly study the average optimality equation (see, for instance,
Rieder (1997)).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the game. Section 3 states the
results. Section 4 gathers the proofs.
32 The game
Consider the following two-player, zero-sum, inﬁnite-horizon game Γp. In any stage n ≥ 1, the
game is in one of two states, s and s. The actual state sn at stage n ≥ 1 follows a stationary
Markov chain, in which sn is equal to sn−1 with probability p ∈ [0,1]. Let θ1 denote the
probability that the initial state s1 is s.
The action sets of the two players are I = {T,B} and J = {L,R}, respectively. We denote
by gs(i,j) the payoﬀ to player 1 when the action combination (i,j) is played in state s. This
payoﬀ function is given in the two tables in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: The payoﬀ function.
The game is played as follows. At each stage n ≥ 1, both players simultaneously choose
actions in ∈ {T,B} and jn ∈ {L,R}. These actions are publicly observed. In addition, player
1 observes the realization of sn+1. The data of the game is common knowledge among the
players.
We stress that the information available to player 2 at stage n only consists in the se-
quence i1,j1,...,in−1,jn−1 of past actions, while player 1’s information contains in addition
the sequence s1,...,sn−1,sn of states, including the current one. In particular, payoﬀs are not
observed.1
The goal of player 1 is to maximize the long-run frequency of stages in which the payoﬀ is
equal to one, while the goal of player 2 is to minimize this frequency. Equivalently, the goal
of player 1 is to minimize the expected time between two occurrences of payoﬀs of one. In
other words, player 1 seeks to minimize the expected time at which his action matches both
1Player 1 can determine his ﬂow payoﬀ from his observations, while player 2 cannot. If he observed his
realized payoﬀs, the game would become trivial.
4the current state and the action of player 2. In this sense, the game Γp bears some similarity
to so-called rendez-vous games, see notably Alpern and Gal (2002, 2003), Gal and Howard
(2006), and Lin (2007).
Observe that, for p = 1/2, the states (sn) are independent random variables. The two
players then eﬀectively face a sequence of independent, identical one-shot games with incom-
plete information, and the repetition of a stage-game optimal strategy is an optimal strategy
in the Markov game: it is optimal to optimize payoﬀs myopically, because the information
revealed on the current state is irrelevant for the future. At the other extreme, for p = 1,
the current state is ﬁxed throughout the game, and Γ1 then coincides with the well-known
Example I.2 in Aumann and Maschler (1995). In both cases, the value can be derived from
the value of the one-shot game. The open and challenging question is the case p ∈ (0,1),
which is henceforth assumed.
Since player 1 always observes the state, a naive strategy available to player 1 consists in
systematically matching the current state. However, player 2 would then infer the current
state from player 1’s action, and would thus play next whichever action is most likely to
mismatch the next period’s state. Player 1 would obtain no more than min{p,1 − p} in the
long run. As we shall see, player 1 can do signiﬁcantly better.
A strategy for the uninformed player, player 2, is a function τ : ∪n∈N(I × J)n−1 → [0,1],
where τ(h) is the probability assigned to the action L after the sequence h of actions. A
strategy for player 1 can be described by a function
σ : ∪n∈N(S × I × J)
n−1 → [0,1] × [0,1],
with the following interpretation. Given a sequence h of past actions and past states prior to
stage n, σ selects a pair (x,y) = σ(h) of mixed actions. This pair speciﬁes which mixed action
is used, as a function of the current state, in stage n: the action T is played with probability
x if the current state sn turns out to be s, and it is played with probability y if sn = s.
Given a strategy pair (σ,τ), let Pσ,τ denote the probability measure over the set of inﬁnite
plays induced by (σ,τ), and Eσ,τ the corresponding expectation operator. The distribution
Pσ,τ also depends on θ1, the probability that the initial state is s. Results are independent of
θ1, which is ﬁxed throughout, and it is therefore omitted hereafter.










denote the average payoﬀ in the ﬁrst N stages.





for every strategy τ of player 2. Player 1 can guarantee v if he has a strategy that guarantees
v.





for every strategy σ of player 1. Player 2 can guarantee v if he has a strategy that guarantees
v.
The real number v ∈ R is the value of the game if both players can guarantee v. The
corresponding strategies σ∗ and τ∗ are then called optimal.
If (σ∗,τ∗) is a pair of optimal strategies, then γ(σ∗,τ∗) := limN→∞ γN(σ∗,τ∗) does exist,












for every σ,τ. The converse also holds.
3 Results
It follows from Renault (2006), or Neyman (2008), that the game Γp has a value vp, which
is both the limit of the values of the N-stage games as N goes to inﬁnity, and the limit of
the values of the δ-discounted game, as the discount factor δ goes to one. As mentioned, vp
is independent of the initial distribution θ1 (for p ∈ (0,1)). Also, because of the symmetry
6of the game, it must be that vp = v1−p for every p.2 Therefore, it is suﬃcient to study vp for
p ∈ [1/2,1).
Our goal is to determine the value vp and to identify optimal strategies for both players.
We ﬁrst summarize our ﬁndings regarding the value.
We are able to solve the game Γp for a range of values of p. We ﬁrst state results concerning
the value vp.
Theorem 1 The following holds:
1. vp =
p
4p−1, for p ∈ [1/2,2/3], and vp ≤
p
4p−1 for p ≥ 2/3.
2. Let p∗ be the unique real solution of 9p3 − 13p2 + 6p − 1 = 0 (p∗ ⋍ 0.76). One has
vp∗ =
p∗
1−3p∗+6(p∗)2 (vp∗ ⋍ 0.35).
The ﬁrst statement settles an open question raised in Renault (2006) consisting in de-
termining v2/3. Computing the value for, say, p = 3/4, remains an open problem, but the
statement also provides an upper bound on vp valid for all p. A lower bound is provided below.
Independently of us, and using diﬀerent methods, Marino (2005) establishes that vp =
p
4p−1
for p ∈ [1/2,2/3]. In Section 4, we describe the feature that sets apart the case p ∈ [1
2, 2
3] from
the case p >
2
3.3




3] and p = p∗. Given
a strategy σ of player 1, let θn(σ) denote the conditional probability that sn = s, given the
actions played by both players in the ﬁrst n−1 stages.4 The value θn(σ) represents the belief
that player 2 holds in stage n, assuming that player 1 uses strategy σ.
2To see this, start from a strategy σ of player 1, and deﬁne a ‘mirrored’ strategy σ′, obtained by ﬂipping
actions and states at even stages. That is, given a ﬁnite history h, we ﬁrst construct h′ by changing at all
even stages every appearance of T (resp. B, s, s) to B (resp. T, s, s), and we deﬁne σ′(h) to be σ(h′) at odd
stages, and 1 − σ(h′) at even stages. Given a strategy τ for player 2, we deﬁne its mirrored version τ′ in a
similar way. It is immediate to check that the average payoﬀ induced by (σ′,τ′) in the game Γ1−p is equal to
the average payoﬀ induced by (σ,τ) in Γ. This readily implies our claim.
3Marino manages to compute the limit of the values of the ﬁnitely repeated game. His approach does not
yield optimal strategies.
4Even if transition probabilities do not depend on player 2’s actions, and player 2 does not observe states,
the conditional probability θn(σ) may still depend on player 2’s actions, since player 1’s actions may depend
on player 2’s past actions. That is, the value of θn(σ) is independent of the strategy of player 2, but may
depend on past actions of player 2, and the distribution of θn(σ) may depend on the strategy of player 2.
7When checking for optimality properties of a given strategy σ for player 1, we assume the
use of such a strategy, and assume that it is known to player 2, so that player 2 can recursively
compute θn(σ) and act upon it. It is therefore natural to look for optimal strategies σ of player
1 in which player 1’s mixed action in stage n only depends on θn(σ), and on the current state.5
Player 1’s strategy σ∗ is deﬁned as follows. Given θ := θn(σ∗) at stage n, the strategy σ∗





If sn = s, Play T with probability
1−θ
θ ,





If sn = s, Play T with probability 1,
If sn = s, Play T with probability 1 − 1−θ
θ .
Table 1: the strategy σ∗
We shall prove that this strategy is optimal both for p ∈ [1
2, 2
3] and for p = p∗. Numerical
calculations seem to suggest that it is optimal for all values in the whole interval (2
3,p∗) as well,
but we have been unable to prove this. Part of the diﬃculty lies in the following observation.
When player 1 is known to follow the strategy σ∗, the sequence of posterior beleifs held by





3], but not when p >
2
3. As a consequence, it is not clear how to compute the highest
amount that is guaranteed by σ∗, except for speciﬁc values of the parameter such as p∗ (see
Remark 6 for an elaboration on this point).
Player 2’s optimal strategy diﬀers according to the parameter range considered. We de-
scribe a ﬁrst strategy τ∗ of player 2, that can be implemented using a simple two-state au-
tomaton. The two states are labelled ξ0,ξ1. The initial state of the automaton is irrelevant. In
state ξ0 (resp. in state ξ1), the automaton plays R (resp. L) with probability
2p
4p−1. Transitions
between ξ0 and ξ1 depend only on player 1’s action and are given by:
(ξ0,T) → ξ1, (ξ1,T) → ξ1,
(ξ0,B) → ξ0, (ξ1,B) → ξ0.
That is, the automaton moves to ξ0 (resp. to ξ1) whenever B (resp. T) is played.
5There is no circularity here, since the computation of θn involves only the strategy of player 1 in the ﬁrst
n − 1 stages.
















Figure 2: Player 2’s strategy τ∗
In Figure 2 (and Figure 3 below), each state is labelled (below) by its name, and (above)
by the probability that the action R is played in that state. Transitions are described by
arrows.
For p = p∗, we must instead consider player 2’s strategy τ∗∗ that can be implemented by
the following automaton with four states, labelled 1 − p, 1 − ˜ ξ, ˜ ξ and p.
x x x x
1 − p 1 − ˜ ξ ˜ ξ p














Figure 3: Player 2’s strategy τ∗∗
Theorem 2 The following holds:
1. The strategy σ∗ is optimal for all p ∈ [1/2,2/3], and for p = p∗.
2. The strategy τ∗ is optimal for all p ∈ [1/2,2/3], and the strategy τ∗∗ is optimal for p∗.
We comment on the ﬁrst statement. Whenever p is not equal to 1/2, the sequence (sn)
is autocorrelated, so that any information on sn revealed by player 1 at stage n can be used
by player 2. Casual intuition suggests that player 1 should therefore trade oﬀ the ﬂow payoﬀ
that he obtains, with the amount of information that his action discloses about the state.
Somewhat surprisingly, this trade-oﬀ is resolved in an extreme way for p ∈ [1/2,2/3]. Indeed,
9it is simple to check that the mixed action speciﬁed by σ∗ at any stage n, as given in Table 1,
forms an optimal mixed action of player 1 in the one-shot game with incomplete information
in which the state is drawn with probabilities θn(σ∗) and 1 − θn(σ∗), and only player 1 is
informed of the state. In this sense, the strategy σ∗ is myopically optimal.6 Thus, statement 1
implies that when the underlying Markov chain is suﬃciently mixing, playing in a myopically
optimal way is optimal in the long run for such values of p. It can be shown that a similar
result holds in any Markov game.7
According to the second statement, an optimal strategy of player 2 can be found within
the strategies that can be implemented with ﬁnite automata. Whether this holds for all
parameters remains an open question.
Let us now brieﬂy discuss the case of discounted versions of the game. Our proof follows
a guess-and-check approach: we guess optimal strategies and check optimality using a ver-
iﬁcation theorem. We could use a similar approach and analyze discounted games, using a
dynamic programming principle. Note that both the value and the optimal strategies would
then depend on the distribution of the initial state.
It is plausible that σ∗ is an optimal strategy in discounted games as well. Indeed, if a
myopic strategy is optimal when payoﬀs are not discounted, it might a fortiori be optimal
when some positive weight is assigned to current payoﬀs. On the other hand however, none
of the strategies τ∗ and τ∗∗ can possibly be an optimal strategy in discounted versions of the
game, except possibly for highly speciﬁc initial distributions of the state. We have no guess
to oﬀer on the optimal behavior of player 2 in discounted games.
In spite of this negative comment, Theorem 2 yields some results in discounted games.
It can be checked that the strategy σ∗ is approximately optimal in all long, ﬁnitely repeated
games:8 given ε > 0, there is an horizon N such that γn(σ∗,τ) ≥ vp − ε for every strategy τ,
whenever the length n of the game exceeds N. Together with the property that the values of
ﬁnitely repeated games and of discounted games here converge to the same value, this implies
that σ∗ is an ε-optimal strategy in all discounted games, provided the discount factor is high
6Indeed, σ∗ plays at every stage as if the current stage were the last one.
7Note that the mixed action in Table 1 is not the unique optimal strategy in the one-shot game. However,
among optimal mixed actions, it is the only one for which player 2 is indiﬀerent between playing L and R,
and it is the one that reveals the least amount of information about the state.
8Similar claims hold for τ∗ and τ∗∗.
10enough.
As mentioned, we have not established that σ∗ is optimal for all values in the range
(2/3,p∗), although it appears to be so numerically. As it turns out (see Section 4), the payoﬀ
that player 1 obtains by following this strategy, denoted by γp, is independent of the strategy




= u0 + u0u1 + u0u1u2 +     ,




un+1 = max{ψ(un),1 − ψ(un)}.
There seems to be no explicit solution to this sequence, except for a countable set of points,
as explained and described in Subsection 4.4.
Figure 1 features both the upper bound p/(4p − 1), the lower bound γp and, in between,
the value vp. The latter two functions are obtained numerically.
4 Proofs
Proofs are organized as follows. In Subsection 4.1, we state the main theorem from Markov
decision processes that is used throughout, and explain how to apply it to a Markov game. In
Subsections 4.2 and 4.3, we prove all claims relative to players 2 and 1 respectively. Subsection
4.4 provides a lower bound on vp.
4.1 Average Cost Optimality Equations and Applications
We here state a version of the well-known Average Cost Optimality Equation (ACOE) for
general Markov Decision Processes (MDP). We next show how to use it to prove the optimality
of speciﬁc simple strategies in Markov games with incomplete information, such as Γp.








Figure 1: The upper bound p/(4p − 1), the value vp and the lower bound γp.
Proposition 3 Let (S,A,r,q) be a MDP with a compact metric space S, a compact action set
A, a continuous payoﬀ function r : S ×A → R, and a continuous transition rule q: S ×A →
∆(S) such that q(  | s,a) has ﬁnite support for every (s,a) ∈ S × A.
If there is v ∈ R and a bounded function V : S → R such that







′ | s,a)V (s
′)
!
for each s ∈ S, (1)
then v is the value of the MDP, for each initial state s ∈ S. Furthermore, a stationary strategy
α = (α(s)) is optimal whenever α(s) attains the maximum in the right-hand side of (1), for
every s ∈ S.
Moreover, if, there is s∗ ∈ S such that the sequence n(vn(s) − vn(s∗)) has a point-wise
limit V for every s ∈ S, and if the value v of the MDP is independent of the initial state, then







′ | s,a)V (s
′)
!
for each s ∈ S. (2)
For a proof, see, e.g., Feinberg and Shwartz (2002). In Proposition 3, ∆(S) stands for
the set of probability distributions over S. The value v is the supremum over all policies φ










. Observe that the function V is
determined only up to an additive constant.
Consider a Markov game with incomplete information, such as the game Γp. Suppose
ﬁrst that one is looking for the highest long-run payoﬀ v that player 1 can guarantee when
using σ∗. The strategy σ∗ is given, so that player 2 eﬀectively faces a MDP over the state
space [0,1], where an element θ ∈ [0,1] is interpreted as the conditional probability θn(σ∗)
that player 2 attaches to the state being s. The value of this MDP coincides with the highest
long-run payoﬀ v that σ∗ guarantees.
It turns out that in the game Γp, the strategy σ∗ that was deﬁned in Table 1 satisﬁes the
following: player 2 is always indiﬀerent between playing L and R. Hence, the value of this
MDP can also be computed by restricting player 2 to one action, say L. In particular, letting r
and q denote the reward and the transition functions of this auxiliary MDP, v is characterized
by the existence of a function V over [0,1] such that




′ | θ,L)V (θ
′) for each θ.
On the other hand, let now τ be a strategy that can be implemented by a ﬁnite automaton
(with deterministic transitions). Suppose that one is looking for the highest long-run payoﬀ
v that player 2 can guarantee when using τ. Since player 1 observes the actions chosen by
both players, he can compute at every stage the current state of the automaton. Since he also
knows the current state of the game, player 1 essentially is facing a MDP whose state space
is the product of the automaton’s state space and of {s,s}. The ACOE can be used to ﬁnd
the value of the MDP, hence to ﬁnd v, and a best reply to τ.
4.2 Player 2
Here, we prove that τ∗ guarantees
p
4p−1 for all p ≥ 1
2, which establishes the ﬁrst part of
Theorem 1.
Lemma 4 The strategy τ∗ of player 2 guarantees p/(4p − 1) for all p ≥ 1/2.
13Proof. As player 1 knows the state of player 2’s automaton and the current state, he
essentially faces a MDP with four states: S = {(s,ξ),(¯ s,ξ),(s, ¯ ξ),(¯ s, ¯ ξ)}. In each one of these
four states he has two available actions, T and B, and the payoﬀ is
r((s,ξ);T) =
2p
4p−1 r((s,ξ);B) = 0,
r((¯ s,ξ);T) = 0 r((¯ s,ξ);B) =
2p−1
4p−1,
r((s, ¯ ξ);T) =
2p−1
4p−1 r((s, ¯ ξ);B) = 0,
r((¯ s, ¯ ξ);T) = 0 r((¯ s, ¯ ξ);B) =
2p
4p−1.
Consider now the transition out of state (s,ξ), when player 1 plays T. Following T, the
automaton state moves to ¯ ξ. On the other hand, the state of the game moves to ¯ s with
probability p. As a result, the next state of the MDP is (s, ¯ ξ) with probability 1−p, and (¯ s, ¯ ξ)
otherwise. All other transitions are obtained in the same fashion.
By the ACOE, v =
p
4p−1 is the value if and only if there is a function V : S → R that
satisﬁes




+ pV (s, ¯ ξ) + (1 − p)V (¯ s, ¯ ξ),
pV (s,ξ) + (1 − p)V (¯ s,ξ)
￿
, (3)
v + V (¯ s,ξ) = max
￿
pV (¯ s, ¯ ξ) + (1 − p)V (s, ¯ ξ),
2p − 1
4p − 1
+ pV (¯ s,ξ) + (1 − p)V (s,ξ)
￿
, (4)




+ pV (¯ s,ξ) + (1 − p)V (s,ξ),
pV (¯ s, ¯ ξ) + (1 − p)V (s, ¯ ξ)
￿
, (5)
v + V (s, ¯ ξ) = max
￿
pV (s,ξ) + (1 − p)V (¯ s,ξ),
2p − 1
4p − 1
+ pV (s, ¯ ξ) + (1 − p)V (¯ s, ¯ ξ)
￿
. (6)
14These equations are symmetric. As is easy to check, they imply that V (s, ¯ ξ) = V (¯ s,ξ) and





V (s,ξ) = V (¯ s, ¯ ξ) = 0,





Here, we prove the results concerning player 1. First, we will prove that σ∗ guarantees p/(4p−
1) whenever p ∈ [1/2,2/3]. Together with the results of the previous subsection, this yields
vp = p/(4p − 1), and implies that σ∗ and τ∗ are indeed optimal for that range of values of p.
Next, we will consider the case where p = p∗, and prove that σ∗ and τ∗∗ are optimal
strategies.
4.3.1 The case p ∈ [1/2,2/3]
We here prove that σ∗ is optimal in Γp, for all p ∈ [1/2,2/3]. Under σ∗, and when the posterior
probability of s is θ <
1







L R L R
State s State s









Observe that the total probability that the action B is played is θ, so that the total
probability that the action T is played is 1 − θ.
Lemma 5 The strategy σ∗ guarantees p/(4p − 1), for each p ∈ [1/2,2/3].
15Proof. Consider the MDP over the state space [0,1] of posterior beliefs, induced by σ∗.
Recall that the action of player 2 does not aﬀect the evolution of the posterior belief and note
that, when facing σ∗, both actions L and R yield the same current payoﬀ, θ. Therefore, the
value of this MDP can be found by restricting player 2 to play, say, L in each and every stage.
Transitions in this MDP are as follows. For concreteness, let θ ≤ 1/2:
• If player 1 played B at some stage, the state at that stage was ¯ s. Therefore, player 2’s
posterior belief assigns probability 1 − p to the next state being s;
• If player 1 played T at some stage, player 2 updates his belief, and assigns a probability










= 1 − p + (2p − 1)
θ
1 − θ
to the next state being s.
In order to prove that the strategy σ∗ guarantees p/(4p − 1), we therefore need to ﬁnd a
function V , symmetric around 1/2, such that the equality
p
4p − 1
+ V (θ) = θ + (1 − θ)V
￿




+ θV (1 − p) (7)
holds for each θ ≤ 1/2.
Observe that one has 1 − p + (2p − 1) θ
1−θ ≥ 1/2, whenever p ∈ [1/2,2/3]: under σ∗, the
posterior probability is either p, 1−p, or jumps from one half of the posterior space [1−p,p]
to the other.
Therefore, we need only ﬁnd a function V : [1 − p,1/2] → R, such that
p
4p − 1
+ V (θ) = θ + (1 − θ)V
￿




+ θV (1 − p).
One can verify that the function V (θ) =
θ
4p − 1
is a solution. The result follows.
Remark 6
16There is little hope to extend this proof for values of p beyond 2/3. Indeed, the above proof
rests on the fact that (7) has a simple solution, V . This in turn is related to the fact that,
given θ, the belief 1−p+(2p−1)
θ
1−θ always lies on the opposite side of 1/2. That is, leaving
aside possible transitions to p or 1 − p, the dynamics of beliefs admits a Markov partition
which consists of two intervals: [1−p,1/2] is mapped into [1/2,p], and vice-versa. As a result,
V has a piecewise linear structure, which consists of two parts. It can be shown that, for
p > 2/3, the corresponding dynamics admits no ﬁnite Markov partition.
4.3.2 The case p = p∗
We here analyze the case where p = p∗, the unique real solution to the equation 9p3 −13p2 +
6p − 1 = 0.
We establish that vp =
p
1−3p+6p2 by showing that it is an equilibrium payoﬀ. Since the
game is zero-sum, the equilibrium consists of optimal strategies. We are going to show that
the following strategy proﬁle is an equilibrium: player 1 uses strategy σ∗, as deﬁned in Table
1, and player 2 uses strategy τ∗∗, as deﬁned in Figure 3.
When facing σ∗, player 2 is always indiﬀerent between playing L or R. Since σ∗ is inde-
pendent of player 2’s actions, the payoﬀ is independent of player 2’s strategy. In particular,
player 2’s automaton is a best-reply to σ∗.
We now prove that σ∗ is a best-reply to τ∗∗, for appropriate values of z1 and z2. As before,
player 1 is facing an MDP with 8 states. Each state is composed of the current state (2
alternatives) and the state of player 2’s automaton (4 alternatives).
View the labels 1−p,1− ˜ ξ, ˜ ξ,p of player 2’s automaton as ﬁctitious beliefs, set ˜ ξ =
p
3p−1 ⋍
0.5944, and let θ1, the distribution of the initial state, coincide with the initial state of the
automaton.9
We ﬁrst claim that, for p = p∗ and for our choice of ˜ ξ, the state ξn of player 2’s automaton
at stage n coincides with θn(σ∗).
Indeed, suppose that player 2 knows that he is facing σ∗, and computes beliefs accordingly.
Denote by φ(θ | a) the belief of player 2 in stage n+1, if his belief was θ in stage n, and after
9Recall that the distribution of the initial state is irrelevant for the determination of the value.
17player 1 played a ∈ {T,B} in stage n. By Bayes’ rule, and for θ > 1/2, one has
φ(θ | B) =
2θ − 1
θ










φ(θ | T) = p.
Using elementary manipulations, one can verify that
φ(p | B) = ˜ ξ and φ(˜ ξ | B) = 1 − ˜ ξ (8)
whenever player 1 plays B, the posterior belief of player 2 evolves as follows: (i) from p it
moves to ˜ ξ, (ii) from ˜ ξ it moves to 1 − ˜ ξ whereas (iii) from either 1 − ˜ ξ or 1 − p it moves to
1 − p.
By symmetric arguments, this implies that the transitions of the automaton of player 2
mimic the evolution of his posterior belief, provided player 1 follows σ∗. This implies in turn
that the strategy σ∗ induces a stationary Markov strategy in the auxiliary 8-state MDP.
Recall now that the strategy σ∗ assigns positive probability to both actions T and B
whenever the current state is s and θn(σ∗) > 1/2, and whenever the current state is ¯ s and
θn(σ∗) < 1/2 , and assigns otherwise probability 1 to either T or B.
That is, the stationary strategy of player 1 associated with σ∗ (i) assigns positive proba-
bility to both actions in the four states (s, ˜ ξ), (s,p), (¯ s,1 − ˜ ξ) and (¯ s,1 − p), (ii) plays T in
states (s,1 − ˜ ξ) and (s,1 − p) and (iii) plays B in states (¯ s,p) and (¯ s, ˜ ξ).
By symmetry properties, and using the ACOE, this stationary strategy is an optimal
strategy in the MDP with value v as soon as there is a function V such that the following
18system of equations and inequations is satisﬁed:
v + V (s,1 − p) = z1 + pV (s,1 − ˜ ξ) + (1 − p)V (¯ s,1 − ˜ ξ), (9)
v + V (s,1 − p) ≥ pV (s,1 − p) + (1 − p)V (¯ s,1 − p), (10)
v + V (s,1 − ˜ ξ) = z2 + pV (s, ˜ ξ) + (1 − p)V (¯ s, ˜ ξ), (11)
v + V (s,1 − ˜ ξ) ≥ pV (s,1 − p) + (1 − p)V (¯ s,1 − p), (12)
v + V (s, ˜ ξ) = 1 − z2 + pV (s,p) + (1 − p)V (¯ s,p), (13)
v + V (s, ˜ ξ) = pV (s,1 − ˜ ξ) + (1 − p)V (¯ s,1 − ˜ ξ), (14)
v + V (s,p) = 1 − z1 + pV (s,p) + (1 − p)V (¯ s,p), (15)
v + V (s,p) = pV (s, ˜ ξ) + (1 − p)V (¯ s, ˜ ξ). (16)
Eqs. (9) and (10) express the fact that it must be optimal to play T when in state (s,1−p).
The right-hand side of (10) is obtained by noting that, when playing T in state (s,1 − p),
the current reward to player 1 is z1, and the MDP moves to state (s,1 − ˜ ξ) with probability
p, and to state (¯ s,1 − ˜ ξ) otherwise. Eq. (11) is obtained by noting that, when playing B in
state (s,1 − p), the current reward to player 1 is 0, and the MDP moves to state (s,1 − p)
with probability p, and to state (¯ s,1 − p) otherwise. The other conditions are obtained in a
similar fashion.
Since V is determined up to an additive constant, we can set V (s,p) = 0, and then this
system contains 6 equations in 6 variables. The unique solution is
v =
p
1 − 3p + 6p2 ⋍ 0.348291466,
z1 =
4p − 1
1 − 3p + 6p2 ⋍ 0.934232129,
z2 =
2p
1 − 3p + 6p2 ⋍ 0.696582932,
V (s,1 − p) =
6p − 2
1 − 3p + 6p2 ⋍ 1.171881327,
V (s,1 − θ) =
2p
1 − 3p + 6p2 ⋍ 0.696582932,
V (s,θ) =
2p − 1
1 − 3p + 6p2 ⋍ 0.237649197,
V (s,p) = 0.
19One can verify that the inequalities (10) and (12) are satisﬁed in this case.
4.4 A lower bound on vp
Recall that γp is the payoﬀ that player 1 obtains if he uses strategy σ∗, which is independent
of the strategy used by player 2. Plainly vp ≥ γp. In the present subsection we compute γp,
thereby providing a lower bound to vp.
By the ACOE, the number γp is the unique real number such that there is a function V
(symmetric around 1/2) that satisﬁes
γp + V (θ) = θ + (1 − θ)V
￿




+ θV (1 − p) θ ≤ 1/2,
γp + V (θ) = 1 − θ + θV
￿




+ (1 − θ)V (p) θ ≥ 1/2.
As V can be determined up to an additive constant, set V (1−p) = 0. Set θ0 = 1−p, and for
each k ∈ N set
θk+1 = min
￿
1 − p + (2p − 1)
θk
1 − θk





Then θk ∈ [1 − p,1/2], and
γp + V (θk) = θk + (1 − θk)V (θk+1) + θkV (1 − p).
Using V (1 − p) = 0, and given the boundedness of V , it follows that
γp =
θ0 + (1 − θ0)θ1 + (1 − θ0)(1 − θ1)θ2 +    
1 + (1 − θ0) + (1 − θ0)(1 − θ1) +    
.




3p − 1 −
2p − 1
un









u0 + u0u1 + u0u1u2 +    
1 − u1 + u1(1 − u2) + u1u2(1 − u3) +    
= u0 + u0u1 + u0u1u2 +    
20Observe further that, as mentioned, the recurrence equation on (un) writes
un+1 = max{ψ(un),1 − ψ(un)},
where ψ(u) := 3p − 1 −
2p − 1
u
is increasing. Let u∗ be a solution to u = 1 − ψ(u). It is
immediate to check that u∗ ≥ 1/2, hence ψ(u∗) ≤ u∗, for otherwise, the inequality 2u∗ <
ψ(u∗) + 1 − ψ(u∗) = 1 would hold. In particular, if uN = u∗ for some N, then the sequence
(un) is stationary from that stage on.
Next, consider the sequence (wn) deﬁned by w0 = 1 = u0 and




We claim that if wN = u∗ (and wn  = u∗ for n < N), then un = wn for each n < N and
un = u∗ for each n ≥ N. To prove this claim, it is enough to check that 1 − ψ(wn) ≤ ψ(wn)
for n = 1,2,    ,N − 1. To see why this holds, observe ﬁrst that the sequence (wn) is
decreasing. We argue by contradiction, and assume that wk+1 = ψ(wk) < 1−ψ(wk) for some
k < N. Since wk > wk+1 ≥ wN, this yields wN < 1−ψ(wk). Since ψ is increasing, one obtains
wN < 1 − ψ(wN) – a contradiction.
As a result, the computation of γp is easy for those values of p with the property that
wn = u∗ for some n.















(1 − p)(9p − 5)
.
Using standard manipulations, the following appears. Given N, there exists a unique p such
that N is the smallest integer for which uN−1 = uN. This p solves the polynomial equation










For instance, (i) p ⋍ .7589 for N = 2, which is the special case already studied, (ii)
p ⋍ .8583 for N = 3, (iii) p ⋍ .9073 for N = 4, (iv) p ⋍ .9348 for N = 5, etc.
21From the expression of wn, one deduces
w0   wn = (2p − 1)























For instance, γp ⋍ .2880 for p ⋍ .8583 (more precisely, γp is the unique real root of −162 +
1737x − 7279x2 + 15002x3 − 15276x4 + 6169x5 = 0 for p the unique real root of −4 + 37x −
136x2 + 248x3 − 225x4 + 81x5 = 0), γp ⋍ .2460 for p ⋍ .9073, etc. It is readily veriﬁed that
the equation γp =
p
1−3p+6p2, valid for p ⋍ .7589, is not valid on any open interval around this
p.
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